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ABSTRACT
Estimating the Effects of September 11 
on Las Vegas Strip Gaming Volume
by
David Eisendrath
Dr. Bo Bernhard, Examination Committee Chair 
Assistant Professor o f Sociology 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
This paper examines the decrease in gross gaming volume, specifically slot machine
coin-in, on the Las Vegas Strip resulting from the events o f September 11, 2001. An
intervention analysis based on a seasonal ARIMA model was developed from Nevada
Gaming Control Board slot machine coin-in data analyzed from January 1990 to
November 2004. The findings revealed that the Strip experienced an abrupt decline in
gaming volume lasting five months. Although a quick recovery ensued, residual effects
lasted approximately two years. In spite o f the uniqueness of the events o f September 11,
this study should help managers in their response to future terrorist attacks and other
catastrophic events.
m
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
On September I I ,  2001 (September 11 or 9/11), 19 terrorists hijacked four U.S. 
commercial airliners, using the planes to crash into the two main towers o f the World 
Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania (although the latter 
was not an intended target). In the largest terrorist attack in United States history, more 
than 3,000 lives were taken (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). The 
economic costs to the United States included more than $14.0 billion for private 
enterprises and in excess of $2.2 billion for federal, state and local governments.
Cleanup and rescue costs were estimated at more than $11.0 billion (Looney, 2002). The 
largest cost associated with the events o f 9/11, insurance, was estimated to be as high as 
$75 billion (Burritt, 2001/2002). While the loss o f life and direct economic costs o f the 
events of 9/11 were severe, the global political, social and economic landscapes were 
forever changed.
Especially hard hit after September 11 was the hospitality industry, specifically 
tourist destination markets relying upon air travel for the majority o f their business. One 
o f these, the Las Vegas Strip gaming market, was dramatically impacted by September 
11, 2001. Although no published research exists that has attempted to rigorously 
quantify this effect, in the weeks following 9/11 many industry analysts and executives
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were predicting a lengthy recovery. Bill Schmidt, a gaming industry analyst with CIBC 
World Markets in New York, stated:
The real question the operators are asking now is: 'How do I model for another 
event, whether it's in London or domestically?' You have to anticipate the worst 
and that will change the psychology o f people traveling for a long time. I'm more 
cautious about this business, certainly in the near term but also mid term 
(Gellatly, 2001, p. 33).
In an attempt to more thoroughly measure the effects o f 9/11 and help model for 
future attacks, this paper has several objectives. The first is to summarize existing 
research in terrorism, tourism, and gaming forecasting. Through an examination of 
terrorism research, perspective can be gained on how travel and tourism historically have 
recovered in the periods following significant terrorist attacks. Although the events of 
9/11 were unquestionably unique, examining current and historical trends is necessary to 
develop thoughtful responses to future terrorist attacks (Coshall, 2003).
To develop a framework for analyzing the downturn experienced by the Las 
Vegas Strip, gaming and tourism forecasting literature is also reviewed. Although there 
has been little published research completed in gaming forecasting, a review of existing 
works should provide a guide in determining an appropriate analysis to be utilized. To 
complement this literature base, a review o f existing tourism forecasting literature will 
also be completed (a topic which has many similarities to gaming and has received 
considerably more research attention). By reviewing these existing literature bases, a 
more thorough understanding o f available research methods can be obtained.
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After reviewing the appropriate literature, this paper will attempt to estimate the 
length and intensity o f the downturn experienced by Las Vegas Strip casinos through an 
intervention analysis based on an autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) 
model. Using slot machine coin-in, a model will be developed that predicts Las Vegas 
Strip gaming volume for the period following 9/11. To then quantify the effects o f 9/11, 
these predicted volumes will be compared to the actual gaming volume experienced by 
the Strip in the months following the terrorist attacks. In the event o f future attacks, such 
an analysis will provide value in helping understand the financial impacts that may result. 
This is especially meaningful given the lack of existing research in casino gaming and 
gaming-related forecasting.
Finally, implications of management decisions are discussed in the context of the 
empirical results. Immediately following the attacks of 9/11, Las Vegas Strip operators 
made a number o f decisions in response to the dramatically altered operating 
environment. These decisions had wide-ranging effects, from decreased employee 
morale to the potential inability to meet future demand because of project delays and 
cancellations. As a result, questions were raised regarding the rational nature o f the 
decision-making process (Binkley, 2002). After gaining historical perspective and 
empirically evaluating the length and intensity o f the downturn following 9/11, 
management decision making processes can be more thoughtfully evaluated.
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Effects o f  9/11
Macroeconomic.
In the months leading up to September I I ,  2001, the United States was in the 
midst o f its first prolonged economic slowdown since the Gulf War. In the first quarter 
of 2001, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shrank by 0.5%. This decrease was followed by 
anemic growth of 1.2% in the second quarter o f 2001 (United States Department of 
Congress, 2005). Consumer confidence, another measure of the economy’s strength, 
decreased in August of 2001, to 114.3, from 116.3 in July and down from an all-time 
high o f 144.7 in May o f 2000 (“Consumer confidence falls,” 2001 ; “U.S. confidence 
rises,” 2000). Prior to September 11, the Federal Reserve Board cut interest rates seven 
times throughout 2001 in an effort to stimulate the economy (Virgo, 2001).
While it is unclear what direction the U.S. economy would have taken in the 
absence o f 9/11, it was immediately clear that the events o f that day would delay the 
recovery of an already sluggish economy. Immediately following the events of 9/11, 
consensus GDP estimates were reduced by 0.5% for the remainder of 2001 and 1.2% for 
2002 (Looney, 2002). Unemployment figures released in October o f 2001, the first full 
month incorporating the events o f 9/11, showed the largest one-month decline since the 
early 1970s. O f the 415,000 people reporting lost jobs in October, travel-related
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industries accounted for 14.5% of this total, or approximately 60,000 jobs (Virgo, 2001). 
In an effort to spur the economy, the Federal Reserve Board lowered interest rates three 
more times during the remainder o f 2001, the first cut coming on September 17, only six 
days after the terrorist attacks.
Stock markets.
Stock markets in the United States often serve as proxies for the general economic 
outlook, especially in times o f crisis. Unfortunately, due to damaged infrastructure, 
dislocated employees and a necessary bereavement period, stock markets in the United 
States remained closed for three days after September 11, 2001, reopening again for 
trading on September 17, 2001 (Alexander & Alexander, 2002). At the close o f trading 
on the 17'*’, the Dow Jones Industrial Average closed down 684 points (7.1%) and the 
NASDAQ Composite Index closed down 116 points (6.8%). These dramatic declines 
reflected the prevailing sentiment o f uncertainty following the terrorist attacks. Hardest 
hit were airline stocks, followed closely by many other travel and tourism related 
businesses. Table 1 illustrates the immediate post-9/11 performance o f some o f these 
firms.
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Table 1
Stock Market Performance Post-9/11
Closing Price
Company 9/10/01 9/17/01
Percentage
Change
AMR / American Airlines 
Northwest Airlines 
UAL / United Airlines
Caesars Entertainment Inc. 
Harrah's Entertainment, Inc. 
Mandalay Resort Group 
MGM Mirage Inc.
Dow Jones Industrial Average 
NASDAQ Composite Index 
S&P 500 Index
$29.70
$19.62
$30.82
$9.92
$28.71
$23.90
$28.31
9605.51
1695.38
1092.54
$18.00
$12.42
$17.50
$8.00
$24.60
$19.00
$22.00
8,920.70
1,579.55
1,038.77
-39.4%
-36.7%
-43.2%
-19.4%
-14.3%
-22.3%
-7.1%
^.9%
Note. From Yahoo, 2005. Yahoo finance historical prices. Retrieved February 2, 2005from  
http://fiinance.yahoo.com.
Travel & tourism.
Given the importance o f air travel in the broader hospitality industry, the effects 
o f 9/11 had an immediate and severe impact on travel and tourism related businesses. 
Some of the reported repercussions in the three weeks following the attacks include 
(Walkup, 2001):
1. Downtown Chicago restaurants experienced business declines o f 45% to 60%.
2. Orlando conventioneers cancelled 345 meetings with a projected 55,500 attendees 
in the months o f September and October 2001.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3. Washington D C., San Francisco, and Oahu ail experienced declines in occupancy 
rates in excess o f 50% compared to prior year periods in the weeks following the 
attacks.
In the short term, air travel was predicted to be limited as a result o f reduced 
consumer confidence, safety concerns, and the threat o f future attacks (Helgerson, 2002; 
Joint Economic Committee, 2001). Large convention and business travel cities such as 
Las Vegas and New York experienced significant cancellations for conventions and other 
events occurring immediately after 9/11 (Joint Economic Committee, 2001). Some 
experts believed that business travel in particular would experience a prolonged downturn 
as the use o f existing and developing forms o f technology, such as teleconferencing and 
virtual offices, increased (Fetto, Paul, Riss, Wellner, Whelan, Yin, et ah, 2001).
In the months following September 11, the longer-term impacts on travel and 
tourism were less clear. Air-related travel and other tourism costs were predicted to rise 
because o f increased insurance and security costs (Looney, 2002). Nevertheless, as Alan 
Greenspan (2001), Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, stated immediately following 
the attacks, “we must not lose sight of our longer-run prospects, which have not been 
significantly diminished by these terrible events” (p. 756).
Las Vegas and September 11 
Outlook prior to 9/11.
Prior to September 11, Nevada gaming was in the midst o f a slowdown affecting 
the broader national economy. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 2001, Nevada casinos 
experienced a total win o f $9.67 billion, a slight increase over the prior year’s win of 
$9.46 billion. This increase was the smallest percentage gain realized by the state’s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
casinos in four years. In addition to the slowing economy, Las Vegas also was affected 
by the lack of new property openings in 2000 and 2001, and competition from California 
Indian casinos (Simpson, 2001).
A number o f public gaming companies with an operating focus on the Las Vegas 
Strip reported 2001 second quarter earnings in July and August o f 2001. Park Place 
Entertainment Inc. (currently known as Caesars Entertainment Inc.) experienced a 
decrease in cash flow o f 7.5% compared to the second quarter of 2000 (Bems, 2001 e). 
The company attributed much o f this slowdown to the performance o f its properties 
outside o f Las Vegas, although its Las Vegas strip properties experienced a net decline in 
cash flow over the prior year period (Bems, 2001 e). Mandalay Resort Group, another 
large Las Vegas Strip operator, also reported poor second quarter results, with earnings 
dropping nearly 20% over the prior year’s period (Bems, 2001a). Chuck Hill, an analyst 
with Thomson Financial/First Call was quoting as saying, “by far the biggest (cause) was 
the economic slowdown” (Bems, 2001a, p. ID).
One exception to the slowdown experienced by Strip operators was the 
performance o f MGM Mirage Inc., formed through MGM Grand Inc.’s purchase of 
Mirage Resorts in early 2000. The largest Strip operator reported a pro forma eamings 
increase of 27% over the prior year’s second quarter. Company executives attributed the 
stellar performance to increased cash flow at MGM Mirage’s six Las Vegas Strip 
properties (Snedeker, 2001). This performance separated MGM Mirage from its Strip 
competitors, with much o f Las Vegas apparently affected by the downtum in the 
economy affecting the entire nation.
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Las Vegas post 9/11.
Since 1977, America has seen the number o f states allowing legalized casino 
gambling grow from one (Nevada) to 36. As o f year-end 2003, there were 443 
commercial casinos (e.g., land-based casinos, limited-stakes casinos, racetrack casinos, 
and riverboat/dockside casinos) in 11 states generating revenue o f $27.0 billion 
(American Gaming Association, 2004). In addition, there were 377 American Indian 
casinos in 28 states, generating revenue o f $16.7 billion (National Indian Gaming 
Commission, 2004). Casinos have become a significant part o f the national economy, 
providing considerable job creation (350,000+ casino workers) and tax revenue ($4.3 
billion in 2003) (American Gaming Association, 2004). As more jurisdictions adopt 
provisions to allow legalized casino gaming, its importance to the national economy 
should continue to grow. Conversely, as Nevada’s monopoly on gaming has 
deteriorated, consumers have been presented with a plethora o f gaming options, often 
within a few hours’ drive of their homes.
Table 2 details the size o f markets that rely upon local residents and repeat 
customers for support. The revenue from these markets is primarily, although not 
exclusively, generated from repeat or local customers. For illustrative purposes, Nevada 
and New Jersey (Atlantic City), markets more heavily weighted towards tourist or 
destination gamblers, also are listed.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 2
Overview o f  Selected Gaming Markets
N um ber Gross Casino
State of Casinos Gam ing Revenue
Illinois 9 $1.7 billion
Indiana 10 $2.2 billion
Iowa 13 $1.0 billion
Michigan 3 $1.1 billion
Las Vegas Strip N/A $2.2 billion
Nevada 256 $9.6 billion
New Jersey 12 $4.5 billion
Note. From “State o f the states: The AGA survey o f casino entertainment,” American Gaming 
Association,2004. Retrieved January 28, 2005 from http://www.americangaming.org/survey/index.cfm. 
“Aimual report,” Illinois Gaming Board, 2004. Retrieved November 15, 2004, from 
http://www.igm.state.il.us/annualreport/2003igb.pdf. “Annual report to the Governor,” Indiana Gaming 
Commission, 2004. Retrieved November 15, 2004, from
http://www.in.gOv/gaming/reports/armual/FY2004-Aimual.pdf. “Riverboat revenue report,” Iowa Racing 
& Gaming Commission, 2004. Retrieved November 15, 2004, from
http://www.state.ia.us/irgc/FYTD04.pdf. “Nevada gaming revenues calendar year 2003 analysis,” Nevada 
Gaming Control Board, 2004. Retrieved November 15, 2004, from
http://gaming.nv.gOv/documents/pdf/cyrr03.pdf. “2003 aimual report,” New Jersey Casino Control 
Commission,2004. Retrieved November 15, 2004, from 
http://www.state.nj.us/casinos/2003%20aimual%20report.pdf..
Nevada’s, and more specifically. Las Vegas’s decreasing contribution to the 
national gambling landscape had meaningful implications for Las Vegas gaming 
operators post-9/11. The availability of local (i.e., drive-to) gaming options had 
significant appeal given Las Vegas’s dependence on air traffic as well as its potential as a 
future terrorist target (Etzel, 2001). These properties eliminated consumer concerns 
relating to airport security and airline travel. Additionally, unlike Las Vegas, these 
properties were not viewed as likely terrorist targets. These options posed an additional
10
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impediment to the recovery of Strip gaming as gamblers who were once foreed to travel 
to Nevada for legalized gaming now had numerous alternatives.
Immediate reaction post-9/11.
The impact o f 9/11 was quickly felt on the Strip given Las Vegas’s dependence 
on air travel and convention business (Joint Economic Committee, 2001). The reduction 
in tourists was abrupt, with hotel occupancy rates in Clark County falling by more than 
12% in September and 8% in October of 2001, versus prior year periods (Nevada 
Gaming Control Board [NGCB], 2001; NGCB, 2002). This drop-off was also noticeable 
through a decline in air travel through Las Vegas’s McCarran Airport, which experienced 
year-over-year declines in passenger arrivals o f 22.2% and 9.2%, in September and 
October o f 2001, respectively (McCarran International Airport, 2005).
In the weeks following 9/11, Las Vegas gaming operators were quiek to respond, 
with initial views estimating a recovery that would take at least a few quarters. Tom 
Gallagher, CEO o f Park Place Entertainment, was quoted as saying: "Clearly, we're in 
for some rugged times over the next few months. The recovery will be gradual” (Bems, 
2001c, p. ID). In response to the attacks and the associated declines in business, gaming 
executives explored multiple avenues to both deerease costs as well as inerease demand. 
MGM Mirage, in an effort to attract customers, lowered room rates by more than 30% in 
the weeks following the attacks. At the company’s flagship property, the Bellagio, rooms 
were discounted to as low as $129 per night, down from previous year levels o f $300 per 
night (Etzel, 2001). Other large Strip properties established similar discounts, with the 
Venetian reducing room rates to as low as $152 per night, from $229 in the weeks before 
the attacks (Bems, 2001c).
11
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To reduce expenses, the primary tool used by executives was to lay off or 
furlough employees. In the two weeks following the attacks, an estimated 12,000 to 
15,000 employees were laid off from Las Vegas casinos (Bems, 2001b). MGM Mirage 
(3,000 employees). Park Place Entertainment (1,500 employees), and Mandalay Resort 
Group (4,500 employees) accounted for a large percentage of this total (Bems, 2001b).
Following the events o f 9/11, large Strip operators also made decisions based on 
medium and long-term business outlooks for Las Vegas. A number o f large projects 
under constraction or planned by Las Vegas Strip operators were temporarily delayed or 
indefinitely postponed. Listed below are a number o f these projects:
1. Mandalay Resort Group announced a temporary delay in constmction o f its 1.8- 
million-square-foot convention center to be located next to Mandalay Bay Resort 
(Bems, 200Id).
2. Park Place Entertainment announced plans to indefinitely delay constmction o f a 
$475 million hotel tower at its Las Vegas Caesars Palaee (Bems, 2001 d).
3. The Venetian Resort announced a constmction delay in the property’s 1,000-room 
tower expansion (Bems, 20011).
Historical Effects o f  Terrorism on Tourism
Throughout history, terrorism frequently has been used as a means to a political 
end. As far back as the Middle Ages, terrorists’ tactics were used in an effort to advance 
ideologies opposing current political powers. In the late 1960s, a wave o f travel and 
tourism-related terrorism occurred which lasted until the late 1980s. A number o f these 
attacks are listed in Table 3.
12
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Table 3
Overview o f  Selected Terrorist Attacks
Date Location Incident
12/17/73 Rome, Italy / Beirut, Pan Am Flight 110 bombed prior to takeoff by Palestinian
Lebanon terrorists
7/29/79 Madrid, Spain Two railway stations bombed by ETA Basque terrorists
6/13/85 Rome, Italy / Beirut, TW A Flight 847 out o f Rome hijacked by Hezbollah
Lebanon / Algiers, Algeria terrorists
10/7/85 Port Said, Egypt Achille Lauro cruise ship hijacked by members o f the 
Palestine Liberation Organization
4/2/86 Athens, Greece TWA Flight 840 bombed during landing, Ezzedine 
Kassam Unit o f the Arab Revolutionary Cells claimed 
responsibility
12/21/88 New York, U S A / Pan Am Flight 103 bombed. Popular Front for the
Lockerbie, Scotland Liberation o f Palestine terrorist group claimed 
responsibility
Note: From International terrorism: Implications and challenge for global tourism, by L.J. D ’Amore and 
T.E. Anuza,1986, Business Quarterly, 51(3), pp. 20-29. Timeline o f Terror, 2002, Thinkquest. Retrieved 
January 29, 2005, from http://library.thinkquest.org/CR02I2088/tertime.htm.
Research conducted on prior terrorist and terrorist-related incidents may provide 
some guidance as to what the short, medium and long-term effects o f such an event might 
be. Much research details the negative immediate and short-term effects of terrorism, 
wars, and political instability on tourism. Brady and Widdows (1988) examine the 
decrease in travel from the United States to Europe during the summer o f 1986, following 
a rash of terrorist-related activity and the Chernobyl nuclear reactor incident. While 
significant declines were noted in the early summer months, the authors also describe a 
noticeable recovery that ensued before summer’s end. D ’Amore and Anuza (1986) also
13
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reviewed the wave of terrorist attacks that affected the tourism industry in the mid-1980s. 
The authors note that prior to 1985, the effeets o f terrorist attaeks on tourism were 
typieally felt for only a few months. Following the onslaught o f attacks in 1985 and 
1986, affected regions often experienced somewhat longer recoveries. In these instances, 
the authors observe that travel-related concerns are often contained to areas associated 
with terrorism (D ’Amore & Anuza, 1986). Additionally, the longer recoveries 
experienced in 1986 could be attributable to multiple events occurring within such a short 
time period.
Significantly less research exists detailing the economic recovery from these 
attacks. Coshall (2003) empirically examined the travel-related recovery from multiple 
terrorist attaeks through intervention analysis. An intervention analysis assesses not only 
the significance o f an impact, but also its form. Interventions can be categorized into 
four basic types, graphically displayed in Figure 1.
14
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(A) Permanent (B) Tenmoraiy
I
(C) Permanent (D) Temporary
Figure 1. Intervention funetions.
Note: From “The threat o f terrorism as an intervention on international travel flows,” by J.T. Coshall, 
2003, Journal o f  Travel Research, 42(1), pp. 4-12.
Based on the above, Coshall (2003) attempted to quantify the form of the effeets 
o f three terrorism-related interventions on consumer air traffic between the United 
Kingdom and the United States, among other destinations. These events were the U.S. 
bombing o f Libya in April o f 1986, the bombing o f Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, 
Scotland, and the Persian Gulf War o f 1990-1991. Intervention analyses determined that 
each o f events studied were characterized as creating temporary abrupt interventions in 
air travel between the U.K. and U.S. (Coshall, 2003). In a similar study, Brady and 
Widdows (1988) found that U.S. air travel to Europe experienced a temporary abrupt 
impact following the wave o f global terrorist events occurring in 1985 and 1986.
15
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Although these studies are limited to a brief period of terrorist-related activity affecting 
air travel to and from the United States, they do show how a rapid fall off in demand is 
often followed by a rapid recovery to the pre-attack state.
Forecasting Gaming Revenue
After reviewing terrorist-related literature to gain an understanding of its effeets 
on tourism, a review o f gaming forecasting literature was completed. This literature base 
was used to compare various analyses employed in evaluating revenue in multiple 
gaming jurisdictions, and their applicability in predicting gaming revenue on the Las 
Vegas Strip in the months immediately following 9/11. Although a paucity o f research 
exists, a number o f forecasting methodologies were employed in the existing works. The 
types o f methodologies used in these studies were often dependent upon the type and 
purpose o f the conducted research.
Taxable gaming revenues.
Cargill and Eadington (1978) completed some of the first published research in 
forecasting gaming volume in an effort to assist governments in estimating gaming- 
related taxes. Using a variety o f methods, the authors attempted to develop forecasting 
models for Washoe County (including Reno-Sparks), Clark County (including Las 
Vegas), and Douglas County (including South Lake Tahoe). The techniques used 
included econometric models, naïve models, and an ARIMA model. O f these methods, 
the ARIMA model was deemed the most appropriate, based on the value o f time-series 
models in the presence o f both identifiable seasonal and systematic trends. Analysis 
using econometric and naïve forecasting methods resulted in similar but less accurate
16
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forecasting results. Finally, difficulty exists in determining meaningful predictors when 
developing causal eeonometrie models (Cargill & Eadington, 1978).
Shonkwiler (1992) followed up the work o f Cargill and Eadington (1978) in 
predicting taxable gaming revenues in Nevada. The author promoted the use o f an 
ARIMA model due to the assumed stochastic nature o f the data. Additionally, 
seasonality in the data could be modeled using quarterly dummy variables (Shonkwiler, 
1992). In opposition to the use o f econometric models, the author notes the inability to 
incorporate the macro level changes that have occurred in gaming over time (e.g., 
widespread legalization). Shonkwiler (1992) also notes that, “since the gross taxable 
gaming revenue series represents a mixture of other quantifiable measures and a 
conglomeration of different types o f economic behavior, any explanation in terms o f 
behavioral equations would have nowhere near the parsimony of the model adopted” (p. 
248). Research by Cargill and Eadington (1978) and Shonkwiler (1992) highlight the 
value of ARIMA modeling when analyzing gaming revenue. These studies stress the 
benefits of this analysis in comparison to other time series models and econometric 
modeling techniques.
Extraordinary events.
Similar to September 11, the Asian financial crisis of late 1997 and 1998 had 
meaningful impacts on the travel and tourism economy. Although its effects were more 
gradual than those of 9/11, its impact on Las Vegas Strip gaming volume was extremely 
pronounced. Gu (1999) attempted to quantify the resulting decrease in Las Vegas Strip 
gaming activity by examining the drop, or total money wagered, on baccarat and pai gow 
poker -  two games preferred by Asian tourists (Gu, 1999). In order to develop a base
17
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
from which to compare the actual performance during and after the financial crisis, trend 
prediction models were developed based on data for the ten years prior to the start o f the 
crisis. Seasonally adjusted models predicted monthly game drops for baccarat, pai gow 
poker, as well as blackjack (a game that should be less affected given its relative lack of 
desirability among Asian players). Using these models, drops for these games were 
estimated for a twelve-month period from October 1997 to 1998, which were then 
compared to the actual drops (Gu, 1999). When compared to their predicted model 
drops, baccarat and pai gow poker experienced tremendous drop-offs in revenue during 
the Asian financial crisis. In contrast, actual blackjack drop was higher than the predicted 
value for the period in question. These findings suggest that there were dramatic effects 
on Asian tourism and table games play because o f the financial crisis. Gu explains these 
results through two different theories. Firstly, because o f the crisis, the number o f Asian 
players and the amounts they wagered may have deereased. Secondly, the gaming 
patterns o f the Asian players may have been altered by the finaneial crisis. Players may 
have experienced a lower threshold for risk because o f decreased wealth from the erisis 
(Gu, 1999).
Deregulation.
Three noteworthy studies have been conducted that examine the impact of 
deregulation on gaming volume (Nichols 1998a, 1998b; Shonkwiler, 1993). 
Methodologically speaking, these studies are relevant to an examination o f the effects of 
9/11 given the nature of deregulation. Similar to September 11, deregulation requires an 
analysis o f a time series where a single (and sometimes multiple) infieetion point can be 
identified.
18
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In assessing the impaet o f deregulation in Atlantie City, Nichols (1998b) used an 
intervention analysis based on an ARIMA model. This study attempted to empirically 
test the impact of both increased operating hours and slot machine floor space in Atlantic 
City casinos, beginning in 1991. As noted earlier, the value o f an intervention analysis is 
its ability to estimate the effect o f an extraneous event that occurs at a specific point in a 
time series.
Prior to 1978, Nevada was the only state in America to offer legalized casino 
gaming. With the introduction of casino gaming in Atlantic City, Nevada casinos faced 
domestic competition for the first time. Shonkwiler (1993) attempted to quantify the 
effeet o f Atlantic City casinos on Nevada gaming volume using a structural time series 
model. In support of this methodology, the author lists a number of associated 
advantages including the ability to incorporate stochastic trends, seasonality, and non- 
stationary time-series (Shonkwiler, 1993).
In May of 1994, Iowa removed many o f the strict regulatory restrictions placed on 
its casino riverboats. These restrictions included maximum wager and loss amounts, 
casino square footage as a pereentage o f total riverboat size, and mandated sailing 
requirements. Nichols (1998a) examined the impacts of this deregulation on casino win, 
win per admission, and total admissions using regression analysis with the following 
independent variables: deregulation (binary variable) location, day o f week, real per 
capital income, trend, season, and property (Nichols, 1998a). The author notes the value 
in the chosen model to isolate the impacts o f deregulation from other exogenous factors 
(i.e., control variables).
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Each o f the above-mentioned studies modeled a deregulatory event using an 
intervention analysis. For each study, different base models (e.g., ARIMA, structural 
time series, multiple regression) were used depending on the various market segments 
analyzed.
Econometric models.
Thalheimer and Ali (2003) developed an econometric model to predict demand in 
casino slot machine wagering at 24 Midwestern riverboats and racinos. The authors used 
an expanded set o f predictors to forecast demand, succinctly summarized as “price and 
product characteristics o f the subject gaming facility and of competing gaming venues, 
consumer income and factors influencing the market environment including government 
regulations” (Thalheimer & Ali, 2003, p. 908).
In contrast to previous researeh, the authors were able to develop an econometric 
model that fit the data with a high degree o f explanatory power (R^ = 0.937). This study 
differentiates itself Ifom previous research in its attempt to predict demand at the 
property level as opposed to aggregate market-level volume. Given the property-level 
nature o f the analysis used, in addition to the previously noted restrictions associated with 
using econometric modeling in predieting gaming volume, there is limited applicability in 
this study when examining the recovery o f Las Vegas Strip gaming volume post-9/11.
Forecasting market life cycles.
As a means of increasing tax revenue, casino gambling legalization emerged as a 
topic o f discussion in many states during the late 1980s. Mississippi was one of the first 
states to pass legislation allowing such gambling, with its first riverboats coming online 
in August o f 1992. Two notable studies (Chang, 1995; Moss, Ryan & Wagoner, 2003)
20
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used historical gaming revenues to develop prediction models for the future of 
Mississippi gaming. These studies assist Mississippi and other states considering 
legalization in preparing for the long-term economic impacts associated with casinos.
Chang (1995) utilized a learning curve model (see Table 4) to predict the maturity 
point for the Harrison County, Mississippi gaming market (including Biloxi and 
Gulfport). This study provided initial expectations o f the growth prospects that other 
states would likely experience. The model predicted a trend that indicated Harrison 
County casinos had reached maturation some two years after the introduction o f gaming. 
At the time of the study, these results implied that the sustainable growth of casino 
revenue in Harrison County was questionable, potentially not providing the expected 
benefits projected at the time o f legalization (Chang, 1995).
Table 4
Learning Curve Model 
Model R = R '^ ( l - e ‘“)
Where:
R = Total gaming revenue by casinos in coastal Mississippi
R'^ = Gaming Revenue at the maturity level
a = Slope o f the curve for given R*'^
t = Time measured in months
Note: From “The birth o f a new industry: Casinos in the coastal Mississippi,” by S. Chang, 1995, The 
Journal o f  Business Forecasting, 14(3), p. 8.
In a comparable study of the product life cycle of the entire Mississippi gaming 
industry. Moss, Ryan, and Wagoner (2003) analyzed gaming revenue using a time-series 
decomposition model. Empirical evidence generated from the model indieated that the
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Mississippi casino industry had followed (at the time of eompletion o f the study) Butler’s 
S-shaped product life eyele curve through Stage 5 (see Table 5). Similar to the 
conelusions drawn by Chang (1995), the authors coneluded that the Mississippi gaming 
market was unable to continue its growth trajectory. Specifically noted are model results 
implying that growth cannot be manufaetured through the simple addition of casino 
space. Factors including both in-market and out-of-state competition should force the 
market to reinvent itself over time in order to sustain growth (Moss, et al., 2003).
Table 5
Resort Property Life-Cycle Stages
1. Exploration
2. Involvement
3. Development
4 Consolidation
5. Stagnation
6. Decline
7. Rebirth
Note: From “An empirical test o f Butler's resort product life cycle: Forecasting casino wiimings,” by S.E. 
Moss, C. Ryan, and C.B. Wagoner, 2003, Journal o f  Travel Research, 41(4), 394.
These studies examined emerging gaming markets at points in time that were 
relative early in their respective life cycles. Given the distinetiveness o f September 11 
and the maturity o f the Las Vegas Strip, their relevance to a study o f gaming volume on 
the Las Vegas Strip post September 11 is limited. For the purpose o f this study, much of 
their value comes in developing a complete framework for the available methodologies in 
forecasting gaming revenue.
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Forecasting Tourism Demand
Given the laek o f existing forecasting literature in gaming, tourism-related 
foreeasting literature also was examined. For the purposes of this study, tourism 
literature was reviewed primarily for diseussions regarding forecasting methodologies. 
More speeifieally, literature was identified which quantitatively and qualitatively 
evaluated multiple foreeasting techniques.
There is a well-understood and established value o f accurate foreeasting in 
tourism due to the perishable nature o f the product (Archer, 1994). In eondueting a 
review of the existing empirical research base, Witt and Witt (1995) discussed several 
key findings. The bulk o f research in this area, and therefore covered in their review, is 
based on international tourism. The types o f models used in the majority o f researeh can 
be divided into four main eategories: (1) econometric models, (2) spatial models (e.g., 
gravity models), (3) time series models, and (4) qualitative models (e.g., Delphi 
approach). O f these models, eeonometrie models were the most frequently used, 
followed by naïve 1 (i.e., no change) and naïve 2 (i.e., eonstant growth rate).
In research that compares eeonometrie models to other methods, the eeonometrie 
models proved to be the most accurate, but by a narrow margin (28% of the examined 
eases vs. 23% for naïve 1). This is especially disturbing when considering the ex post 
nature o f eeonometrie models (Witt & Witt, 1995). In a eomparison of non-naïve models 
of various complexities, the authors found that less complex models (e.g., univariate 
ARIMA models) outperformed their more eomplex counterparts (e.g., multivariate 
ARIMA models). In contrast, in research where non-naïve models (e.g., exponential
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smoothing) were compared to naïve methods, the more complex methods proved to be 
more accurate in their forecasting accuracy (Witt & Witt, 1995).
Unlike international tourism demand, Witt, Newbould, and Watkins (1992) note 
that domestic tourism demand tends to be less volatile due to the reduced effects of 
external influences such as political and economic instability. This reduced volatility 
should increase the predictive value o f more complex models relative to their naïve 
counterparts. The authors’ hypothesis was tested by predieting Las Vegas visitor arrivals 
using three different time series models: Naïve 1, Naïve 2, and exponential smoothing. 
The models were ranked in terms of accuracy by mean absolute percentage error 
(MAPE), with exponential smoothing proving to be the most aceurate followed by Naïve 
2. Results were attributed to the ability o f exponential smoothing models to incorporate 
the trend and seasonality components present in the historical Las Vegas visitor 
information (Witt, et al., 1992).
One final piece of tourism forecasting research retrospectively evaluated the 
efficiency of prediction models. Tideswell, Mules and Faulkner (2001) attempted to 
measure the effectiveness o f an integrative approach to forecasting. Using a combination 
of various quantitative and qualitative methods, the South Australian Tourism 
Commission commissioned a study to predict future tourism demand in their region.
This study was used to predict future demand from both international and domestic 
tourists in the state of South Australia.
Given the numerous advantages, as well as pitfalls, of forecasting, it is important 
to review the effectiveness of various forecasting models (Tideswell, et al., 2001). In 
order to predict demand, the following models were used: Holt’s exponential smoothing.
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a naïve method based on average annual rate o f ehange, a simple linear trend, and a top- 
down approach using countrywide numbers foreeasted by the Australian Tourism 
Forecasting Council (TFC) (Tideswell, et al., 2001). After developing forecasts using the 
above listed methodologies, the eomplete set of projections was mailed to loeal South 
Australian tourism experts. These experts were asked to consider which set of 
projections were deemed the most plausible. After tabulating these results, a panel of 
experts was asked to convene and diseuss these results until a consensus was reached. 
Although this is not a perfect example o f the Delphi survey method, time constraints did 
not allow for a complete process. Finally, the authors of this paper retrospectively 
evaluated the conclusions reached through the quasi-Delphi process. Accuracy of the 
chosen projections was evaluated using MAPE (Tideswell, et al., 2001).
By retrospectively evaluating the accuracy o f the projection process, it was 
determined that projections for the international segment of tourism were extremely 
accurate with a MAPE o f 3%. In this segment of the projections, a combination o f the 
Holt method and TFC top-down model were used. For the majority o f the modeling of 
domestic tourism, a linear trend model was used. The projection technique used here was 
also considered highly accurate, although MAPE was somewhat higher at 10%. In 
addition to evaluating the techniques chosen through the quasi-Delphi process, the 
authors also reviewed the other models originally used. It is interesting to note that in 
many cases, the model ehosen by the experts did not result in the lowest MAPE. For 
example, the naïve method based on average annual growth rates predieted domestic 
tourism figures with the lowest MAPE (2.5%) (Tideswell, et al., 2001). This research, 
coupled with other reviewed literature, highlights the value of simple modeling
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techniques vis-à-vis their more complex counterparts. Less complex approaches often 
provide more accurate forecasting results, especially relative to the amount o f analysis 
required.
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY
Data Collection
Secondary data for the analysis was obtained from Nevada Gaming Control Board 
Gaming Revenue Reports (NGCB, 1990-2004), eonsisting of monthly information from 
January 1990 to November 2004. This analysis will use slot machine coin-in on the Las 
Vegas Strip for the 179 monthly periods examined. Coin-in represents the total dollar 
amount inserted into slot machines during play (Kilby & Fox, 1998). Slot machine 
volume was chosen as an indieator o f overall gaming demand on the Las Vegas strip due 
to its increasing importance in the overall gaming mix (see Table 6).
Table 6
Las Vegas Strip Slot vs. Table & Games Win
Win as % of Total Las Vegas Strip Gaming Win 
Year Slots Table & Games
1999 49.2% 50.8%
2000 49.5% 50.5%
2001 50.9% 49.1%
2002 52.4% 47.6%
2003 53.7% 46.3%
2004") 54.3% 45.7%
Note: Through November 2004. From “Gaming revenue report,” 1990-2004, Nevada Gaming Control
Board.
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Previous gaming studies have noted the various advantages and disadvantages of 
using measures o f aggregate gaming volume (e.g., coin-in) versus win. Nichols (1998b) 
elected to use total gaming win to estimate the impact o f deregulation in Atlantic City. 
This study notes the distortion o f results obtained by using other measures of demand 
(e.g., gross casino revenue, EBITDA, etc.). Gu (1999) describes the use o f table games 
drop, or total “money put into gaming action” as a better predictor of overall “gaming 
propensity or demand” (p. 358). Drop may serve as a better proxy for overall demand 
due to the short-term volatility associated with the house advantage (i.e., “luck”). To 
eliminate this short-term presence o f luck in this study, coin-in has been used as a 
measure o f demand.
Selection o f  Time Series Model
Based on the reviewed research o f time series analysis, an ARIMA model was 
chosen to examine the data. ARIMA models provide numerous advantages in time series 
analysis, especially when analyzing gaming data. One advantage of ARIMA models 
when dealing with gaming data is their ability to aceount for seasonal and systematic 
trends (Cargill & Eadington, 1978). Also mentioned by Cargill and Eadington (1978) is 
the predictive ability of ARIMA models vis-à-vis other methods (e.g., econometric, 
naïve). Finally, Shonkwiler (1992) notes the parsimony of ARIMA models relative to 
other foreeasting tools in predicting gaming revenue.
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
Analysis o f  Data
Developing a base model.
In order to identify gross features o f the time series, the data was first seasonally 
decomposed using the ratio-to-moving average method, also known as Census Method I. 
As noted from the plots in Figure 2, the data exhibit a significant upward trend as well as 
a strong seasonal eomponent.
Next, the autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial autocorrelation function 
(PACF) of the residuals were plotted to determine other components o f the ARIMA 
model. An examination of these plots in Figure 4 shows the presence of a moving 
average (MA) component of 1, as indicated by the significant peak at Lag 1. The 
presenee o f significant lags at and surrounding lags 12 and 24 also indicate the presence 
o f a seasonal autoregressive (AR) component o f 1.
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Figure 2. Seasonal decomposition o f data.
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31
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The data was next fitted to an ARIMA model o f the form (0,1,1) x (1,0,0). To 
determine goodness o f fit, this model was evaluated using a number o f diagnostic checks. 
First, t-values for both the moving average and seasonal autoregressive terms were 
determined. Both components had t-values that were significant at the 0.05 level. Next, 
ACF and PACF residual plots were reviewed (see Figure 5). These plots show the 
elimination o f a significant peak at Lag 1. Although significant coefficients remain at 
Lags 13 and 17. Box-Ljung statistics were also examined through the first quartile of the 
data. Table 7 shows significance levels above the 0.05 level through the first 45 data 
points.
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Figure 5. ACF and PACF residual plots o f ARIMA Model (0,1,1) x (1,0,0).
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Table 7
Box-Ljung Statistics fo r  ARIMA Model (0,1,1) x  (1,0,0)
Lag Autocorrelation
Standard
Error
Box-Ljung
Statistic
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom Significance
1 0.006 0.074 0.006 1 94.0%
2 0.007 0.074 0.014 2 99.3%
3 (0.041) 0.074 0.321 3 95.6%
4 (0.030) 0.074 0.489 4 97.5%
5 0.055 0.073 1.053 5 95.8%
6 (0.019) 0.073 1.118 6 98.1%
7 0.004 0.073 1.121 7 99.3%
8 0.070 0.073 2.031 8 98.0%
9 0.023 0.073 2.134 9 98.9%
10 (0.083) 0.072 3.440 10 96.9%
11 (0.125) 0.072 6.449 11 84.2%
12 (0.072) 0.072 7.450 12 82.6%
13 (0.180) 0.072 13.715 13 39.4%
14 0.058 0.072 14.381 14 42.2%
15 (0.052) 0.071 14.915 15 45.8%
16 (0.063) 0.071 15.709 16 47.3%
17 0.221 0.071 25.413 17 8.6%
18 0.045 0.071 25.821 18 10.4%
19 (0.058) 0.070 26.492 19 11.7%
20 (0.052) 0.070 27.040 20 13.4%
21 (0.030) 0.070 27.226 21 16.4%
22 (0.001) 0.070 27.226 22 20.3%
23 0.078 0.070 28.470 23 19.9%
24 (0.012) 0.069 28.501 24 23.9%
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Box-Ljung
Lag Autocorrelation
Standard
Error
Statistic
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom Significance
25 0.034 0.069 28.742 25 27.5%
26 0.110 0.069 31.296 26 21.7%
27 (0.084) 0.069 32.807 27 20.4%
28 (0.170) 0.068 38.981 28 8.1%
29 0.024 0.068 39.109 29 10.0%
30 (0.112) 0.068 41.814 30 7.4%
31 0.073 0.068 42.976 31 7.5%
32 (0.037) 0.068 43.284 32 8.8%
33 (0.051) 0.067 43.854 33 9.8%
34 0.035 0.067 44.129 34 11.4%
35 (0.052) 0.067 44.724 35 12.6%
36 (0.054) 0.067 45.391 36 13.6%
37 (0.022) 0.066 45.503 37 15.9%
38 (0.018) 0.066 45.579 38 18.6%
39 (0.054) 0.066 46.253 39 19.8%
40 0.100 0.066 48.590 40 16.5%
41 0.046 0.065 49.093 41 18.1%
42 (0.013) 0.065 49.131 42 20.9%
43 0.157 0.065 54.965 43 10.4%
44 (0.067) 0.065 56.042 44 10.5%
45 (0.045) 0.064 56.530 45 11.6%
Finally, a p-p probability plot o f the residuals was examined. Figure 6 indicates 
that residual errors follow a normal distribution. The diagnostic checks conducted 
indicate that the model is a good initial fit to the data.
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Figure 6. Normal probability plot o f residuals for ARIMA model (0,1,1) x (1,0,0).
Detailed in Table 8 is the dramatie growth in room supply and easino square 
footage that has occurred on the Las Vegas Strip since 1989. The Strip went through two 
significant expansions during the 1990s, the first occurring in late 1993 with the openings 
o f the Luxor, Treasure Island, and the MGM Grand. These properties added 
approximately 10,400 rooms and 355,000 square feet o f casino space to the Las Vegas 
Strip. The second expansion began in late 1998, with the opening of the Bellagio, and 
concluded in late 1999 with the opening of the Paris Las Vegas. These properties
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increased the number o f rooms and easino square footage by 12,600 and 495,000, 
respectively.
Table 8
Significant Las Vegas Strip Property Openings
Date Property Rooms
A pproxim ate  
Casino Size (sq. ft.)
11/22/89 Mirage 3,039 107,200
06/19/90 Excalibur 4,032 110,000
10/15/93 Luxor 2,526 100,000
10/26/93 Treasure Island 2,900 83,800
12/18/93 MGM Grand 5,005 171,500
06/21/96 Monte Carlo 3,002 90,000
01/03/97 New York - New York 2,023 84,000
10/15/98 Bellagio 3,005 155,000
03/02/99 Mandalay Bay 3,643 135,000
05/03/99 Venetian 3,036 120,000
09/01/99 Paris Las Vegas 2,916 85,000
08/18/00 Aladdin 2,567 100,000
It is hypothesized that these groups of openings created new paradigms in gaming 
volume on the Las Vegas Strip. Because o f the tremendous increases in capacity that 
occurred over relatively short periods, the Strip was able to generate volume that was 
unattainable prior to their openings. In order to test this hypothesis, dummy variables
36
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
were added to the existing ARIMA model in the months surrounding property openings 
in 1993 and 1998-1999. In eaeh ease, months up to and including an opening were 
represented by the variable 0, while all periods following an opening contained the 
variable 1. The first dummy variable was included for all months after December o f 
1993, accounting for the opening o f the Luxor, Treasure Island, and MGM Grand. The 
second dummy variable was included for all months after April o f 1994, accounting for 
the opening o f the Bellagio and Mandalay Bay. Other hotel openings in 1999 (the 
Venetian and Paris Las Vegas) may have occurred far enough apart in time from the 
other hotel openings to create an insignificant impaet. Additionally, the higher-end 
gaming focus o f the Bellagio and Mandalay Bay may have accounted for a dramatic 
increase in gaming revenues on the Strip.
Again, diagnostic cheeks were completed on the new ARIMA model containing 
dummy variables accounting for the two sets o f easino openings. T-values for all 
components were significant at the 0.05 level. ACF and PACF residual plots (see Figure 
7) show improved results relative to those found in the original ARIMA model, with the 
only significant lag remaining at Lag 17. Box-Ljung statistics were examined through 
the first quartile o f the data. Table 9 shows these values to be significant at the 0.05 level 
through the first 45 data points.
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Figure 7. ACF and PACF residual plots o f ARIMA Model (0,1,1) x (1,0,0) with Strip 
property openings.
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Table 9
Box-Ljung Statistics fo r  ARIMA Model (0,1,1) x  (1,0,0) with Strip Property Openings
Lag Autocorrelation
Standard
Error
Box-Ljung
Statistic
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom Significance
1 0.038 0.074 0.258 1 61.2%
2 0.007 0.074 0.265 2 87.6%
3 (0.081) 0.074 1.463 3 69.1%
4 (0.038) 0.074 1.724 4 78.6%
5 0.021 0.073 1.806 5 87.5%
6 (0.024) 0.073 1.917 6 92.7%
7 0.022 0.073 2.009 7 95.9%
8 0.073 0.073 3.013 8 93.4%
9 0.016 0.073 3.062 9 96.2%
10 (0.066) 0.072 3.891 10 95.2%
11 (0.103) 0.072 5.917 11 87.9%
12 (0.065) 0.072 6.726 12 87.5%
13 (0.136) 0.072 10.308 13 66.9%
14 0.065 0.072 11.144 14 67.5%
15 (0.019) 0.071 11.218 15 73.7%
16 (0.039) 0.071 11.522 16 77.6%
17 0.207 0.071 20.085 17 27.0%
18 0.036 0.071 20.345 18 31.4%
19 (0.052) 0.070 20.882 19 34.3%
20 (0.062) 0.070 21.654 20 36.0%
21 (0.004) 0.070 21.657 21 41.9%
22 0.021 0.070 21.752 22 47.5%
23 0.055 0.070 22.375 23 49.8%
24 (0.007) 0.069 22.386 24 55.6%
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Box-Ljung
Lag Autocorrelation
Standard
Error
Statistic
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom Significance
25 0.009 0.069 22.404 25 61.2%
26 0.109 0.069 24.907 26 52.4%
27 (0.074) 0.069 26.063 27 51.5%
28 (0.139) 0.068 30.174 28 35.5%
29 0.059 0.068 30.927 29 36.9%
30 (0.068) 0.068 31.936 30 37.0%
31 0.073 0.068 33.105 31 36.5%
32 (0.043) 0.068 33.503 32 39.4%
33 (0.054) 0.067 34.157 33 41.2%
34 (0.023) 0.067 34.276 34 45.5%
35 (0.073) 0.067 35.469 35 44.6%
36 (0.073) 0.067 36.688 36 43.7%
37 0.017 0.066 36.754 37 48.0%
38 (0.019) 0.066 36.837 38 52.3%
39 (0.060) 0.066 37.673 39 53.0%
40 0.064 0.066 38.619 40 53.2%
41 0.041 0.065 39.005 41 56.0%
42 (0.015) 0.065 39.055 42 60.1%
43 0.149 0.065 44.320 43 41.6%
44 (0.034) 0.065 44.588 44 44.7%
45 (0.030) 0.064 44.810 45 48.0%
Finally, a normal probability plot was o f the residual errors from the ARIMA 
model with dummy variables. Figure 8 indicates that the plot follows a normal 
distribution.
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Figure 8. Normal probability plot o f residuals for ARIMA model (0,1,1) x (1,0,0) with 
Strip property openings.
Predicting performance post-9/11.
Using data from January 1990, through August o f 2001, the ARIMA model with 
dummy variables was used to predict slot coin-in for September 2001, and the months 
following the aftermath. Diagnostic checks run indicated that the base ARIMA model 
with dummy variables was a good fit to this subset o f the data (see Appendix). Figure 9 
shows the predicted values compared to actual values for slot coin-in in the months 
following August 2001.
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Figure 9. Slot coin-in predicted versus actual values for September 2001 to August 2002.
Discussion o f  Results
The results o f these projections indicate that the effects o f 9/11 lasted from 
September o f 2001 through January of 2002, with the predicted value for February of 
2002 resulting in a value slightly above the projected lower confidence limit. In order to 
determine what, if  any, the lasting effects o f 9/11 were, a dummy variable was created to 
account for the five-month affected period.
Using data from January 1990, through January o f 2002, the ARIMA model with 
the new dummy variable was used to predict slot coin-in beyond January o f 2002. 
Diagnostic checks run indicated that the base ARIMA model with the new dummy 
variable was a good fit to this subset o f the data (see Appendix). Figure 10 shows the 
predicted values compared to actual values for slot coin-in in the months following 
January o f 2002. From February 2002 through February o f 2004, the predicted values for 
slot coin-in fall in the lower half o f the predicted range. It is not until March of 2003,
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that the actual value exceeds the mean predicted value. These results indicate that while 
the Las Vegas Strip’s initial recovery occurred relatively quickly, there were potentially 
lingering effects from 9/11 that lasted for approximately two years.
A ctua l v s . P re d ic ted  S lo t C oiir-ln
Actual Slot Coin-in 
CZZ3 Predicted Slot Coin-in
 U pper C onfiderce Limit
 Low er Confidence Lima
4,500 4 ,500
4,300 4 ,300
4,100 4,100
3,900 3,900
3,700 3,700
3,500
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2,700 2,700
2,500 2,500
Figure 10. Slot coin-in predicted versus actual values for February 2002 to November 
2004.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Future Implications
Las Vegas as a future terrorist target.
Given its growing significance as a representation of Western culture. Las Vegas 
has frequently been mentioned as a potential future target for terrorist attacks (Etzel, 
2001). Although the September 11 attacks did not directly target Las Vegas, lessons 
learned can be applied to a future attack in which Las Vegas is a primary target. Existing 
terrorist-related research (Brady & Widdows, 1998; Coshall, 2003) has shown tourism 
and travel markets to recover relatively quickly following a rapid falloff in volume. 
D ’Amore and Anuza (1986) note that the likelihood o f a more protracted recovery exists 
in regions directly affected by attacks.
This study provides a guide for recovery following a significant terrorist attack for 
a location which was not directly affected. In applying this research to future events that 
may occur in or around Las Vegas, managers may need to plan for a more conservative 
recovery relative to that experienced post-9/11.
Employee morale.
Following September 11, significant layoffs occurred at most major Las Vegas 
Strip properties. In spite of the rapid re-hiring o f a large percentage of these employees, 
these work force reductions created significant ill will among employees. This was
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exacerbated following the disclosure of significant bonus awards to executives at many of 
the larger companies (Binkley, 2002). As one anonymous Strip executive stated, “There 
was a perception among the labor team that some o f the general managers saw their 
bonuses growing wings and flying away and before they knew what was happening, they 
just panicked and laid people o ff ’ (Binkley, 2002, p A2). Although some reduction in 
workforce may have been warranted given the significant slowdown in business post- 
9/11, the severe corporate reaction appeared to aggravate an already difficult situation.
Medium and long-term business decisions.
In response to an expected slowdown post-9/11, many Strip properties announced 
the indefinite postponement o f a number o f significant projects. In mid-2005, some of 
these projects are only now nearing completion (e.g., $475 million hotel tower at Caesars 
Palace Las Vegas). Given the relatively rapid recovery that ensued, the delays created by 
postponing these projects may have lessened the ability o f operators to meet increased 
demand. Future choices regarding large capital outlays should incorporate the decision 
making process from 9/11 in order to allow operators to effectively meet future demand. 
Recommendations fo r  Further Study
Aggregate table and games analysis.
Although slot win now comprises a majority o f the total gaming win on the Las 
Vegas Strip, table and games play is still a significant portion of the total revenue mix. 
Additionally, various characteristics also separate these two different markets (e.g., 
method of transportation to Las Vegas). Given differences in these customer segments, 
conclusions drawn from slot machine play should not be generalized across all markets. 
For example, table games players, especially high-end players, are more likely to visit
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Las Vegas via air as opposed to car. Given the decrease in air traffic following 9/11, this 
market may have recovered more slowly than the slot machine market. To fully evaluate 
the effects o f 9/11, an analysis o f all segments o f the gaming market is necessary.
Comparison o f  various games.
In addition to looking at aggregate table and games volume, value exists in 
comparing the recovery o f various games (e.g., blackjack, craps, and baccarat). For 
example, Gu (1999) notes the importance o f Asian customers’ contribution to Baccarat 
gaming volume. Given the drop-off in air traffic to Las Vegas in the months following 
the events o f September 11, games characterized by high-end play (e.g.. Baccarat) may 
have recovered more slowly than slot machine gaming volume.
Comparison across markets.
Although the Strip comprises the majority o f the Las Vegas gaming market, other 
areas o f the city (e.g., the Boulder Strip, Downtown, North Las Vegas) are meaningful 
contributors to the city’s overall gaming volume. In contrast to the tourist-centric focus 
of this research, studies o f these areas may provide insight into the recovery o f various 
locals’ markets. Future analysis could examine how spending patterns o f Las Vegas 
locals was affected by the events of 9/11. Additionally, research may examine how other 
markets like Downtown Las Vegas were affected relative to the Strip.
Limitations
Software.
The software (SPSS 13.0 with Trends add-on) used to perform the analysis in this 
study allowed for two types o f intervention analyses, pulse and step functions. This 
software did not allow for the modeling o f an event like 9/11, which experienced a rapid
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drop-off followed by a gradual recovery. Although we can approximate the length of the 
affected period and the associated recovery, it is difficult given the tools used to quantity 
the exact length or amount o f either.
Conclusion
Using slot machine coin-in volume, this paper has examined the effect of the 
events o f September 11, 2001 on the Las Vegas Strip. A seasonal ARIMA model 
incorporating an intervention analysis was developed from Nevada Gaming Control 
Board data analyzed from January 1990 to November 2004. The resulting investigation 
indicated that the Strip experienced an abrupt decline in gaming volume lasting five 
months, with residual effects lasting approximately two years. This conclusion supports 
previous terrorist-related tourism research showing that markets typically recovery fairly 
quickly after major terrorist attacks. These results provide an interesting contrast to the 
management position taken following 9/11, estimating a more protracted recovery.
Given the length o f the 9/11 recovery and the noted recoveries from previous terrorist 
attacks, future management may want to prepare for a more rapid recovery. At a 
minimum, managers should be more careful in approaching significant decisions with 
implications lasting beyond a predicted recovery period.
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APPENDIX
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
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Figure 11. AGE and PACE residual plots o f post-August 2001 prediction ARIMA model.
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Table 10
Box-Ljung Statistics fo r  Post-August 2001 Prediction ARIMA Model
Lag A utocorrelation
S tandard
E rro r
Box-Ljung
Statistic
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom Significance
1 0.028 0.084 0.109 1 74.1%
2 (0.026) 0.084 0.209 2 90.1%
3 0.020 0.083 0.268 3 96.6%
4 (0.054) 0.083 0.695 4 95J%
5 0.050 0.083 1.055 5 95.8%
6 0.031 0.082 1.195 6 9T7%
7 0.041 0.082 1.439 7 98.4%
8 0.015 0.082 1.471 8 99.3%
9 (0.026) 0.081 1.574 9 99.7%
10 (0.068) 0.081 2.272 10 99.4%
11 (0.042) 0.081 2.540 11 9&6%
12 (0.135) 0.080 5.366 12 94 j%
13 (0.155) 0.080 9.094 13 7&6%
14 0.057 0.080 9.607 14 79.0%
15 0.011 0.080 9.626 15 84.3%
16 (0.053) 0.079 10.068 16 86.3%
17 0.161 0.079 14.212 17 65.2%
18 0.015 0.079 14.249 18 7L3%
19 (0.055) 0.078 14.737 19 73.9%
20 0.011 0.078 14.757 20 7^0%
21 0.014 0.078 14.790 21 83.3%
22 0.014 0.077 14.825 22 8T0%
23 0.070 0.077 15.644 23 87.0%
24 0.082 0.077 16.787 24 85.8%
25 (0.036) 0.076 17.009 25 88.D6
26 0.097 0.076 18.644 26 85.1?t
27 (0.089) 0.076 20.031 27 82.9%
28 (0.076) 0.075 21.062 28 82.3%
29 0.094 0.075 22.642 29 793%
30 (0.052) 0.075 23.125 30 81.0%
31 0.031 0.074 23.303 31 833%
32 (0.000) 0.074 23.303 32 86.9%
33 (0.093) 0.074 24.886 33 84.4%
34 0.048 0.073 25.308 34 834%
35 (0.110) 0.073 27.570 35 81.094
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Figure 12. Normal probability plot o f residuals for post-August 2001 prediction ARIMA 
model.
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Figure 13. ACF and PACF residual plots of post-January 2002 prediction ARIMA 
model.
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Table 11
Box-Ljung Statistics fo r  Post-January 2002 Prediction ARIMA Model
Lag Autocorrelation
Standard
Error
Box-Ljung
Statistic
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom Significance
1 0.019 0.082 0.053 1 81.8%
2 (0.023) 0.082 0.133 2 93.5%
3 0.018 0.082 0.179 3 98.1%
4 (0.039) 0.082 0.408 4 98.2%
5 0.044 0.081 0.702 5 98.3%
6 0.021 0.081 0.770 6 99.3%
7 0.047 0.081 1.106 7 99.3%
8 0.029 0.080 1.236 8 99.6%
9 (0.019) 0.080 1.294 9 99.8%
10 (0.086) 0.080 2.461 10 99.1%
11 (0.051) 0.080 2.873 11 99.2%
12 (0.109) 0.079 4.767 12 96.5%
13 (0.161) 0.079 8.909 13 78.0%
14 0.047 0.079 9.265 14 81.4%
15 0.004 0.078 9.267 15 86.3%
16 (0.037) 0.078 9.496 16 89.2%
17 0.158 0.078 13.638 17 69.3%
18 0.002 0.077 13.638 18 75.2%
19 (0.059) 0.077 14.223 19 77.1%
20 0.020 0.077 14.288 20 81.6%
21 0.026 0.076 14.407 21 85.2%
22 0.016 0.076 14.452 22 88.5%
23 0.070 0.076 15.293 23 88.4%
24 0.057 0.076 15.861 24 89.3%
25 (0.033) 0.075 16.057 25 91.3%
26 0.100 0.075 17.831 26 88.2%
27 (0.067) 0.075 18.635 27 88.3%
28 (0.086) 0.074 19.974 28 86.5%
29 0.093 0.074 21.563 29 83.8%
30 (0.064) 0.074 22.314 30 84.2%
31 0.033 0.073 22.522 31 86.6%
32 (0.004) 0.073 22.524 32 89.3%
33 (0.082) 0.073 23.800 33 88.0%
34 0.038 0.072 24.082 34 89.6%
35 (0.110) 0.072 26.405 35 85.2%
36 (0.025) 0.072 26.530 36 87.5%
37 0.095 0.071 28.308 37 84.7%
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Figure 14. Normal probability plot o f residuals for post-January 2002 prediction ARIMA 
model.
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